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New York v. United States: Federalism and
the Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste
INTRODUCTION
Disposal of radioactive waste material is one of the most criti-
cal problems of modern times. Since 1954, when Congress enacted the
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) for the purpose of promoting the commer-
cial use of radioactive materials, the growing use of nuclear energy for
both military and non-military purposes has created a waste disposal
crisis of substantial proportions.
2
Radioactive waste is divided into low-level and high-level waste
categories. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible
for regulating the management of low-level radioactive waste (LLRW),
as well as a number of other nuclear-related operations, including com-
mercial nuclear power plants.3 LLRW "includes all radioactive waste
that is not classified as spent fuel from commercial nuclear power
plants, defense[-related] high-level radioactive waste from producing
weapons, or uranium tailings."4 It includes contaminated equipment,
protective clothing, rags, and sludges, some of which is mixed with
non-radioactive hazardous substances.5
Although 97 percent of LLRW is so slightly radioactive that it
requires little or no shielding to protect the public, the remaining 3 per-
cent consists of materials that must be shielded for periods ranging
from 300 to several thousand years.6 Some of the material classified as
LLRW contains "'hot spots', where concentrations of radioactivity may
be quite high." 7 Even aside from such hot spots, LLRW poses a threat
to human health.8 While nuclear power plants generate the bulk of
1. Atomic Energy Act, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 921 (1954) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297 (1988)).
2. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2414-15 (1992).
3. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), U.S. Congress, Partnerships Under Pressure:
Managing Commercial Low-Level Radioactive Waste 9, 59 (1989) [hereinafter OTA).
4. Id. at 7.
5. Id. at 82-85; R. Lipschutz, Union of Concerned Scientists, Radioactive Waste: Politics,
Technology, and Risk 33-34 (1980).
6. OTA, supra note 3, at 82.
7. Lipschutz, supra note 5, at 34.
8. See, e.g., C. Straub, Atomic Energy Commission, Low-Level Radioactive Wastes-
Their Handling, Treatment, and Disposal 329 (1964) (because all radioactive exposure
damages living cells to some degree, human exposure to radioactivity should be minimized
to the extent practicable); C. Fox, Atomic Energy Commission, Radioactive Wastes 11
(1965) (LLRW contains up to 1,000 times the concentration of radioactivity that is
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LLRW, a significant quantity of LLRW is generated by industry, and
academic and medical institutions.9
States are allowed to regulate LLRW that is generated by the
private sector, as long as the regulations are compatible with, and at
least as restrictive as, those of the NRC. 10 However, states may not reg-
ulate LLRW generated by NRC-licensed nuclear power plants.1 The
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (LLR-
WPAA, or the Act) attempted to solve the problem of insufficient LLRW
disposal capacity in the United States by further shifting responsibil-
ity for LLRW disposal to the states. 12 The Act required each state to
provide an approved disposal site that could be located either within
that state or within a region formed by a compact including that state.
13
In June, 1992, the United States Supreme Court struck down a key pro-
vision of the Act that would have forced a state to take title to all LLRW
generated within its borders if that state failed to meet a 1996 dead-
line for providing such a disposal site.14
This note will examine the constitutional basis for, and the con-
sequences of, that decision. In addition, this note will suggest that the
Court's new criterion for determining when a federal statute violates
principles of federalism be replaced by a more coherent and workable
test resting on a theory of political accountability and on the Guaran-
tee Clause of the United States Constitution. 15
BACKGROUND
In 1980, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Pol-
icy Act 16 (the 1980 Act) in response to the threatened closing of two of
considered safe for direct release).
While the effects of radiation on the human body are imprecisely known,
Lipschutz, supra note 5, at 5-6, it is Flear that long-term exposure to low-level radiation
can lead to cancer, reproductive failure, genetic defects, and birth abnormalities, and
that statistically higher incidences of those diseases are associated with such exposure.
Id. at 14-27.
9. OTA, supra note 3, at 82.
10. Id. at 9 n.10.
11. Id.
12. 42 U.S.C. §9 2021b-2021j (1988).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(c) (1988).
14. New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992).
15. The text of the Guarantee Clause reads as follows: "The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government...." U.S.
Const. art. IV, § 4.
16. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573 (1980), 94 Stat. 3347,
repealed by Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-240, Title I, 99 Stat. 1842 (1985) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d
(1988)).
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the country's three LLRW storage facilities. 17 The threatened closings
came on the heels of a 50 percent reduction in the quantity of radioac-
tive waste accepted at the third facility.18 The purpose of the 1980 Act
was to hold each state responsible for locating a site or sites in which
to dispose of all LLRW generated within that state's borders.19 Pur-
suant to findings that disposal of waste is achieved "'most safely and
efficiently.., on a regional basis"', the 1980 Act gave states the option
of forming regional compacts to dispose of LLRW, subject to ratifica-
tion by Congress.20 As an incentive to form such compacts, beginning
in 1986, a ratified compact could exclude the importation of LLRW from
states outside the compact.21 Unlike its later-amended version, how-
ever, the 1980 Act did not provide any penalties for states choosing not
to enter compacts.22
By 1985, it was apparent that the 1980 Act was not achieving
its intended purpose.23 Thirty-one states had not developed disposal
systems or plans for the systems, and were about to be excluded from
using the three existing facilities. 24 In response to a proposal by the
National Governors' Association, Congress passed the Low-Level Ra-
dioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act (the Act or LLRWPAA). 25 The
Act extended until 1992 the time during which the three existing dis-
posal sites would be required to continue accepting out-of-state or out-
of-region LLRW.26
The Act contained three key provisions. First, a monetary-in-
centive provision allowed the sited states27 to begin demanding pay-
ment of a surcharge in 1986 for out-of-region waste.28 Furthermore,
the sited states could increase the surcharge biannually.29 Twenty-five
17. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2415. The facilities slated to close were Hanford, Washington
and Beatty, Nevada, and the third facility was Barnwell, South Carolina. Id. at 2414.
Without the express approval of Congress, the dormant commerce clause prohibited
these states from excluding out-of-state waste, unless they shut down the disposal
facilities entirely. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
18. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2414.
19. Id. at 2415 (citing Pub.L. No. 96-573, § 4(a)(1), 94 Stat. 3348).
20. Id. (quoting Pub.L. No. 96-573, § 4(a)(1)(B), 94 Stat. 3348).
21. Id. (citing Pub.L. No. 96-573, § 4(a)(2)(B), 94 Stat. 3348).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(a)(2)). "Out-of-region LLRW" refers to LLRW generated
within the borders of states not belonging to the compact in question.
27. "Sited states" refer to states in which LLRW disposal facilities are located. See id.
28. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(1)). The surcharge was imposed in addition to the
usual disposal fees assessed by the disposal facilities. Id.
29. Id. Those surcharges would increase from $10 per cubic foot in 1986 to $40 per
cubic foot in 1990. Id.
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percent of the funds generated by the surcharges were to be placed in
an escrow fund to reimburse states the same percentage of the already-
paid surcharges as those states complied with various deadlines.3° The
deadlines were as follows: 1) states were required to pass legislation
either to join a compact or to "go it alone" by July, 1986; 2) each state
that joined a compact had to identify the state in the compact where
the LLRW-disposal facility would be located, and develop a siting plan
for the facility by January, 1988; and 3) each state that was to operate
a LLRW-disposal facility was required to file an application for a li-
cense to operate the facility by January, 1990.31 States failing to meet
the deadlines could be assessed even greater surcharges. 32
Second, a denial-of-access provision specified conditions under
which LLRW generators could be denied access to the existing disposal
sites.33 If a state missed the July, 1986 deadline by six months, the Jan-
uary, 1988 deadline by one year, or the January, 1990 deadline at all,
LLRW generators in that state could have been denied access to the
Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina disposal facilities. 34
Finally, the take-title provision required that any state failing
to provide for a disposal site by January 1, 1996, either within the state
itself or in another state within its compact region, would have to take
title to all privately generated LLRW within its borders.35 From that
point on, the state would incur any liability stemming from damages
caused by the waste.36
New York chose not to join a regional compact.37 Instead, it
enacted legislation pursuant to LLRWPAA providing for siting and con-
struction of a disposal facility, and identified several potential sites.38
However in 1990, because strong resistance to the plan by residents of
the two counties where the potential sites are located threatened the
future development of a disposal site, the state, along with the two
counties, filed suit against the United States.39
The lawsuit challenged the constitutionality of the Act based
on alleged violations of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Guarantee Clause. 40
The District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed
30. Id. at 2416 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021e(d)(2), (e)(l)).
31. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021 e(e)(1)(c)).
32. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021e(e)(2)(A), (B), (D)).
33. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021e(e)(1), (e)(2), (f)(1)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2416 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2416-17.
39. Id. at 2417.
40. Id.
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New York's complaint.41 New York appealed, but only on grounds of
alleged violations of the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause.
42
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's
dismissal.43 The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice San-
dra Day O'Connor, affirmed the lower court's ruling upholding the con-
stitutionality of the monetary-incentive and denial-of-access provisions
of LLRWPAA, but held that the take-title provision violated the Tenth
Amendment."
THE COURT'S REASONING
While the primary focus of this note is on the Court's decision
regarding the take-title provision of LLRWPAA, a brief discussion of
the Court's analysis of the other two key provisions is intended to help
distinguish those provisions from the take-title provision in terms of
federalism.
The Court began its analysis of the Act's monetary-incentive
provision by asserting that "Irlegulation of the.., interstate market in
waste disposal is ... well within Congress' authority under the Com-
merce Clause", because residents of one state commonly sell space in
their disposal sites to residents of other states.45 The Court then ana-
lyzed each of the three components of the monetary-incentive provi-
sion. First, the Court upheld the Act's authorization for sited states to
impose a surcharge on LLRW, because Congress has the power to per-
mit states to discriminate against interstate commerce.46 Second, the
Court upheld the provision requiring the Secretary of Energy to place
a portion of the surcharge in an escrow account, analogizing federal
41. New York v. United States, 757 F.Supp. 10 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). The court's dismissal
was based on its interpretation of Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985), which prohibited review of national legislation affecting state authority,
unless the legislation restricted a state's "ability to operate in the political arena", or
treated the state inequitably as compared to other states. Id. at 13. Garcia is discussed
infra notes 107-119 and accompanying text.
42. New York v. United States, 942 F2d 114, 118 (2nd Cir. 1991).
43. Id. at 115. The Second Circuit essentially followed the reasoning of the district
court, and added that "rather than discovering defects in the political process, both the
1980 Act and its 1985 Amendments are paragons of legislative success, promoting state
and federal comity in a fashion rarely seen in national politics." Id. at 119. See also discussion
on aspects of the legislative history of the Amendments infra notes 77-78 and accompanying
text.
44. New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992).
45. Id. at 2419-20 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-23 (1978); Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S.Ct. 2019,
2023 (1992)).
46. Id. at 2425-26.
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receipt of part of the surcharge to a federal tax on interstate com-
merce. 47 Finally, the Court upheld the partial reimbursement of the
surcharge to states that meet required deadlines, because such reim-
bursement falls within Congress' power under the Spending Clause.48
The denial-of-access provision was upheld, again because of
Congress' power to allow states to discriminate against interstate com-
merce. 49 The Court did not consider this provision as a mechanism to
force states to regulate LLRW according to the federal program, be-
cause states have the choice not to do so. 5° If a state chooses not to fol-
low the federal guidelines, generators of LLRW within the state's
borders may be prohibited from exporting the waste. In that case, the
waste generators, rather than the states, will bear the burden imposed
by the denial-of-access provision." 51
While the above two provisions of the Act were deemed to en-
courage the states to provide for LLRW disposal facilities, the Court
held that the take-title provision "crossed the line distinguishing en-
couragement from coercion," 52 thereby violating the Tenth Amendment.
The Court observed that although "the text of the Tenth Amendment[ 531
... is essentially a tautology", the amendment "reserve[s] power to the
states... [where] an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a lim-
itation on an Article I power."54 The Court went on to establish such
a limitation by adopting dicta from Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Assn. as the basis of its holding: "Congress may not sim-
ply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the states by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.
' " 55
In distinguishing New York from a line of cases that reflect the
"unsteady path" 56 of the Court's modern Tenth Amendment jurispru-
dence, the Court emphasized that "this is not a case in which Congress
has subjected a state to the same legislation applicable to private par-
47. Id. at 2426.
48. Id. at 2426-27.
49. Id. at 2427.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2428. The search for the line between encouragement and coercion is, in
essence, the heart of the Court's attempt to reinterpret the Tenth Amendment,
53. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const.
amend. X.
54. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2418.
55. Id. at 2420 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
56. Id. The "unsteady path" is principally reflected by three landmark cases: Maryland
v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); and
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See infra notes 91-163
and accompanying text for discussion of these and other pertinent cases.
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ties." 57 In other words, LLRWPAA's take-title provision commands only
the states themselves, not the individual citizens of the states. By con-
trast, the Fair Labor Standards Act58 (FLSA), which was the subject of
the modern landmark cases involving the Tenth Amendment, subjects
state governments to a generally applicable law.59 FLSA was upheld in
its entirety in its most recent visit with the Court.6°
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 61 of 1977
(SMCRA) is another statute the Court compared to LLRWPAA. While
SMCRA is applicable only to the states, Congress gave the states the
choice of enforcing the statute or withdrawing from the field and al-
lowing the federal government to bear "the full regulatory burden." 62
The Court thus implied that the vice of LLRWPAA lies in relieving the
federal government of any burden at all in disposing of LLRW, by com-
pelling the states to choose between enforcing provisions of the Act
and taking on the burden of owning the waste.
Yet another statute that the Court distinguished from LLRW-
PAA is the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 63 of 1978 (PURPA).
PURPA mandated action by state utilities commissions, but that action
only required consideration, and not enactment, of federal proposals. 64
Also, as in the case of SMCRA, states could choose to withdraw from
the field of regulating utilities.65
The Court contended that an essential feature of the United States
Constitution was to remedy the limited powers of the central govern-
ment under the Articles of Confederation by allowing the national gov-
57. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2420.
58. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
59. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2420.
60. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See infra text
accompanying notes 107-119.
61. Pub. L. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (1977) (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)).
62. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2420 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). See infra text accompanying notes 120-128.
63. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3120 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
64. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2421 (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 (1982)).
Justice O'Connor dissented from the FERC majority, asserting that the mandate to the
utilities commissions to consider federal proposals amounted to a commandeering of the
state agencies. FERC, 456 U.S. at 781 n.8 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part). See also infra
text accompanying notes 129-147.
65. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2421 (citing FERC, 456 U.S. at 764). In her dissent in FERC,
Justice O'Connor, in response to the notion that PURPA gave the states a choice whether
to consider the federal proposals, drew an analogy between a state's withdrawing from
the field of regulating utilities and the state's abolishing its legislature. FERC, 456 U.S.
at 781-82 (J. O'Connor, dissenting in part). Here, again, is an illustration of the Court's
continuing difficulty in distinguishing encouragement from coercion.
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ernment to act "directly upon the citizens" without limiting the sov-
ereignty of the states.66 To illustrate the degree of state sovereignty
comprehended by the Constitution, the Court quoted Alexander Hamil-
ton as having exclaimed at New York's ratification convention: "But
can we believe that one state will ever suffer itself to be used as an in-
strument of coercion? The thing is a dream; it is impossible."67 By
drawing on this and similar comments by various Framers of the Con-
stitution, the Court supported its thesis that while Congress can exer-
cise its commerce powers directly on citizens of a state, it cannot
"regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce." 68
The Court considered the take-title provision to be just such
an impermissible regulation of state regulatory authority, and labeled
the provision a "commandeering of] state governments into the ser-
vice of federal regulatory purposes." 69 The take-title provision offered
a state the choice of developing a disposal site for LLRW or ultimately
taking title to privately generated waste. The Court deemed either op-
tion, standing alone as a federal mandate, to constitute compelled reg-
ulation.70 The fact that states had a choice between regulating LLRW
pursuant to congressional instructions and regulating it by taking title
to the waste (also a congressional instruction) was immaterial, ac-
cording to the Court's analysis.71 As the Court put it, "A choice be-
tween two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no
choice at all." 72 The Court also feared that state officials would bear
the brunt of public disapproval for decisions required by the Act, "while
the federal officials who devised the regulatory program remain[ed]
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision[sl." 73
After striking down the take-title provision on Tenth Amend-
ment grounds, the Court chose not to address the Guarantee Clause
challenge of that provision. 74 However, as to the monetary-incentive
66. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2421 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71,
76 (1868)).
67. Id. at 2423 (quoting 2 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 233 (2d ed.
1863)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2428.
70. Id. In particular, the Court claimed that a forced transfer of title to LLRW from
waste generators to the states is equivalent to "a congressionally compelled subsidy
from state governments to radioactive waste producers." Id. While the Court did not
elaborate on the subsidy concept, presumably the essence of this subsidy is that it would
transfer liability for the waste from the private generators to the state. If the state, rather
than the generator, had to pay for the waste disposal costs as well as for personal and
property damages caused by the waste, then the state, in effect, would be paying for
what would otherwise be the generator's expenses.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2424.
74. Id. at 2432. See supra note 15 for the text of the Guarantee Clause.
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and denial-of-access provisions of LLRWPAA, the Court dismissed the
Guarantee Clause challenge, because the possibility that New York
might fail to receive the monetary incentives or lose the right to dis-
pose of LLRW in another state did not "pose any realistic risk of al-
tering the form or the method of functioning of New York's
government."75
The dissent concurred with the majority's handling of the mon-
etary-incentive and denial-of-access provisions, but would have up-
held the take-title provision.76 They saw LLRWPAA as essentially a
ratification of an interstate compromise, developed by the National Gov-
ernors' Association (NGA) and numerous other state officials, and thus
analogous to a compact among all the states.77 Therefore, according to
their reasoning, the take-title provision was not imposed on the states
by the federal government.78
The major point of disagreement raised by the dissenters was
the failure of the majority to analyze the take-title provision under the
Tenth Amendment test established in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority.79 According to that test, Congress' Commerce
Clause power can only be limited by the courts where it is necessary
to protect states from "possible failings in the national political process".
The dissent contended that LLRWPAA represents no "failing of the po-
litical process[, ... [because] the states were well able to look after
themselves in the legislative process that culminated in [LLRWPAA's]
passage."81
75. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2433.
76. Id. at 2435 (White, J., dissenting in part, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, J.J.).
77. See generally id. at 2435-41 (White, J., dissenting in part) for the dissent's view of
the Act's legislative history and the NGA's lobbying efforts.
78. Id. In addressing the dissent's argument, the majority asserted that "[tihe fact
that the Act, like much federal legislation, embodies a compromise among the States
does not elevate the Act... to the status of an interstate agreement requiring Congress'
approval under the Compact Clause." Id. at 2432.
The Court further stated that in any case, state officials cannot consent to an
unconstitutional encroachment on state powers by Congress. Id. at 2431. In support of
its assertion, the Court drew an analogy to the federal doctrine of separation of powers:
"The Constitution's division of power among the three Branches is violated where one
Branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon Branch
approves the encroachment." Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-37 (1976) and
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,944-45 (1983)) (the President cannot consent to an infringement
of his appointment power or veto power).
79. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2441 (White, J., dissenting in part) (citing Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)). The dissent also criticized the majority
for deriving the commandeering criterion from dicta found in cases that did not support
the Court's decision in New York. Id. at 2442 (White, J., dissenting in part)).
80. Id. at 2443-44 (White, J., dissenting in part) (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554).
81. Id. at 2444 (White, J., dissenting in part).
Winter 19941
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The dissent further pointed out that 'Ithe] Court has upheld
congressional statutes that impose clear directives on state officials."
8 2
The majority countered that those prior cases involved only the ap-
plication of the Supremacy Clause, and addressed statutes that regu-
lated individuals, including state officials, rather than mandating state
regulation.8 3
A BRIEF MODERN HISTORY OF THE TENTH AMENDMENT
New York v. United States epitomizes the modern battle between
the Commerce Clause84 and the Tenth Amendment. Underlying this
controversy is the age-old struggle between proponents of strong cen-
tral government and proponents of states' rights.8 5 The struggle is at
the heart of fundamental questions about federalism. The Court's mod-
ern debate over this issue began in 1968 with Maryland v. Wirtz,86 and
has not been laid to rest. Because New York is the latest in a series of
opinions that reflect this ongoing debate, an outline of what Justice
O'Connor referred to as the "unsteady path" 87 of the Supreme Court's
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence will help place the New York decision
in better perspective.
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, cases addressing "New Deal"
legislation greatly expanded the scope of the federal government's
commerce powers. Those cases were based on the recognition that most
commercial activities in an integrated national industrial economy af-
fect interstate commerce; and, in the aggregate, such activities sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.88 This expansion of commerce
powers is typified by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). 89
FLSA, which was upheld in United States v. Darby, mandated a mini-
82. Id. at 2444 n.3 (White, J., dissenting in part) (citing Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483
U.S. 219,227-28 (1987); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,319-20,334-35 (1966);
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392-94 (1947)).
83. Id. at 2429-30. The majority saw no problem with requiring a state judge to enforce
federal law or with the federal courts ordering state officials to personally comply with
federal law. Id. at 2430.
84. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
85. See R. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1210-1222 (1977) for
discussion of the struggle between centralism and decentralism as it relates to environmental
policy.
86. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
87. See supra note 56.
88. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
89. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Ch. 676,52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
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mum hourly wage and minimum overtime rate for private-sector em-
ployees whose work involved commerce or the production of goods
for commerce. 90
A. Maryland v. Wirtz
Congress amended FLSA in 1961 to include all employees in
any private enterprise "engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce." 91 FLSA was amended again in 1966 to include
employees of hospitals, certain other health-care institutions, and
schools, whether those institutions were private or operated by a state
or a state's subdivision.92 Maryland v. Wirtz upheld the amendments
by a 6-2 vote, justifying the extension of federal commerce powers, in
part, on the grounds that "substandard labor conditions among any
group of employees, whether or not they are personally engaged in
commerce or production, may lead to strife disrupting an entire en-
terprise," and ultimately disrupting interstate commerce. 3 The Court
effectively affirmed Congress' plenary power under the Commerce
Clause subject only to the existence of "a rational basis for finding a
chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce."
94
The dissent in Wirtz argued that the 1966 amendment to FLSA
seriously invaded state sovereignty, in violation of the Tenth Amend-
ment, by forcing states to choose between spending more money on
schools and hospitals and curtailing services in those institutions." The
dissenters raised the specter of Congress going so far as to "draw up
each State's budget" in the name of protecting commerce. 96
B. National League of Cities v. Usery
Congress amended FLSA again in 1974, extending its coverage
to nearly all employees of the states and their subdivisions.97 The 1974
Amendments went too far for a more conservative Court, which, in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, overruled Wirtz by a 5-4 margin.98 The
Usery Court established a Tenth Amendment limit to federal statutes
based on the Commerce Clause, holding invalid all regulations that
90. Darby, 312 U.S. at 100.
91. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 186 (1968) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1964 ed.,
Supp. II)) (quoted language is unchanged in the current version at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (supp.
IV 1992)).
92. Id. at 186-187.
93. Id. at 192.
94. Id. at 190 (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-4 (1964)).
95. Id. at 201-3 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 205.
97. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
98. Id. at 855.
Winter 19941
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
"operate to directly displace the states' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional functions."99 In the Court's opinion,
the 1974 FLSA amendments sought to regulate the "States as States", 00
and caused a substantial increase in the costs of providing basic ser-
vices.101 As a result, the amendments "displace[d] state policies regarding
the manner in which they will structure delivery of those . . . ser-
vices." 102
Justice Blackmun announced that he was joining the Court's
opinion with the understanding that the new test would not "outlaw
federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the
federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility com-
pliance with imposed federal standards would be essential." 103 The
dissenters, on the other hand, pointed out that the Tenth Amendment
had never before been interpreted to limit Congress' constitutionally
authorized powers. 104 They described the new test as unworkable, be-
cause the Court failed to articulate any meaningful distinctions among
the various state-operated services on which to determine whether fed-
eral regulation of those services would be constitutionally permissi-
ble.10 5 Instead of attempting to make such a distinction, the dissent
argued that the judiciary should play a limited role in reviewing fed-
eral law regulating commerce, because the national legislative process
would adequately protect, and was designed to protect, state inter-
ests.1o6
C. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
Nine years later, Usery was overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, also by a 5-4 vote.107 Garcia involved yet*
another dispute over the applicability of FLSA. s08 Justice Blackmun,
switching sides and writing for a new majority, declared that the Usery
test was indeed unworkable. 109 He supported his contention by cit-
99. Id. at 852.
100. Id. at 845.
101. Id. at 846-47.
102. Id. at 847.
103. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 861-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan asked rhetorically whether
a state could "engage in business competing with the private sector and then come to
the courts arguing that withdrawing the employees of those businesses from the private
sector evades the power of the Federal Government to regulate commerce". Id. at 872.
105. Id. at 872-80. For example, the dissent wondered why state-operated railroads
should not be considered an essential governmental service, id. at 880 (citing id. at 854
n.18), while state-operated police and fire departments should be. Id. at 880.
106. Id. at 876-78. Justice Brennan contended that the courts' role in such cases should
be limited to reviewing Congress' judgment as to what constitutes commerce. Id. at 876.
107. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
108. Id. at 530.
109. Id. at 546-47.
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ing a long list of lower court opinions to demonstrate the difficulty in
deciding which governmental functions are traditional.11 0 Garcia ef-
fectively adopted the dissent's position in Usery, and rejected any lim-
itation on congressional power under the Commerce Clause, except where
necessary "to compensate for possible failings in the national political
process."111
Citing the works of Framers James Madison and James Wilson,
the Court observed that the federal government was politically struc-
tured to protect the states' sovereign interests.11 2 The Court concluded
that those interests "are more properly protected by procedural safe-
guards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power."11 3 In upholding FLSA in its en-
tirety, the Court said that it did not perceive any aspect of FLSA that
was "destructive of state sovereignty."114
The dissenters, consisting of Justice O'Connor, along with three
of the justices who formed the majority in Usery, reacted bitterly in
three separate opinions.115 Justice Powell argued that "[tihe States' role
in our system of government is a matter of constitutional law, not of
legislative grace." 116 Justice O'Connor observed that when the United
States was founded, there was little inherent conflict in the Framers'
intentions to diffuse power between the national government and the
states, "because technology had not yet converted every local problem
into a national one."11 7 However, now that "virtually every state ac-
tivity.., arguably 'affects' interstate commerce," Congress is in posi-
tion to take over the powers that the Framers envisioned for the states,
thus threatening to erase the intended diffusion of power.118 And Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in a terse statement, predicted that the principles ar-
ticulated in Usery would "in time again command the support of a majority
of the Court."119
D. Environmental Cases
While many of the recent cases dealing with principles of fed-
eralism involved the validity of labor laws such as FLSA, a few cases
110. Id. at 538-39. In Justice Blackmun's view, the net result of the lower court opinions
was to establish an arbitrary, and sometimes contradictory, categorization of traditional
and non-traditional functions. Id.
111. Id. at 554.
112. Id. at 549-52.
113. Id. at 552.
114. Id. at 554.
115. Id. at 557-79 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist and
O'Connor, J.J.); id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 580-89 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting, joined by Powell and Rehnquist, J.J.).
116. Id. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 584 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Winter 1994]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
have addressed the constitutionality of environmental statutes and reg-
ulations. Two such cases were cited by the New York court: Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assn.120 and FERC v. Mississippi.121
In Hodel, coal producers challenged the constitutionality of the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA). 122
SMCRA requires strip mining to be performed so as to minimize any
ecological disturbance, and requires post-mining restoration of the
land.123 SMCRA, as distinguished from FLSA, is an example of a statute
that imposes standards only on private parties. States have the choice
between enforcing federal standards and leaving the regulation of the
mining industry to the federal government.124
The Hodel Court, in a unanimous decision, held that SMCRA
is within Congress' commerce powers125 and does not violate the Tenth
Amendment. 126 The Court found that SMCRA does not regulate the
states as states, because the states are under no obligation to enact their
own regulatory plans.127 If a state chooses not to establish its own
plan, the federal government will bear the entire burden of enforcing
its standards in that state.128
FERC v. Mississippi involved a more controversial issue: a chal-
lenge by the State of Mississippi asserting that certain sections of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) violated both
the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment.' 29 The controversial
sections of PURPA, Titles I and III, were designed to encourage energy
conservation and fair utility rates by "direct[ing] state utility regula-
tory commissions and nonregulated utilities to 'consider' the adoption
and implementation of specific 'rate design' and regulatory stan-
dards."130 Titles I and III also allow citizens to sue in state court to
force the commission to hold a hearing and decide whether to adopt
the federal standards.131
120. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
121. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
122. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264.
123. Id. at 269 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (Supp. III 1976)).
124. Id. at 271 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. III 1976)).
125. Id. at 276-83.
126. Id. at 286-93.
127. Id. at 287-88.
128. Id. at 288.
129. 456 U.S. 742, 752 (1982). For PURPA see supra note 63.
130. FERC, 456 U.S. at 746. These directives include certain detailed prescribed
procedures. For example, the commission is required to hold a public hearing after notice
to examine the standards; the commission must make public its reasons for not adopting
the federal standards; and the Secretary of Energy has the right to intervene in the
commission hearings required under PURPA. Id. at 748-49.
131. Id.
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The Court held unanimously that PURPA falls within Congress'
commerce powers. 132 However, only five members supported the find-
ing that Titles I and III did not violate the Tenth Amendment. The five-
member majority observed that PURPA "attempts to use state regulatory
machinery to advance federal goals,"133 but justified the attempt for
two reasons. First, "Congress could have pre-empted the field" in reg-
ulating private utility activity.134 Second, "the two challenged Titles
simply condition continued state involvement in a pre-emptible area
on the consideration of federal proposals."1 35 However, the Court ac-
knowledged that it had never "sanctioned explicitly a federal command
to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations", 36 and
had previously expressed doubt whether such a command would be
valid. 137 Despite the Court's apparent discomfort in upholding Titles
I and III, it justified its decision to do so, asserting that "PURPA does
not require promulgation of particular regulations."] 38
Justice O'Connor was one of the four justices who disagreed
with the Court on the constitutionality of Titles I and III. Her dissent
foreshadowed her analysis in New York. Arguing that Titles I and III of
PURPA "conscript state utility commissions into the national bureau-
cratic army",139 she labeled PURPA a congressional commandeering of
the state commissions.140 In response to the majority's suggestion that
merely compelling state consideration of a federal proposal is not a
constitutionally significant intrusion on state powers,1 41 Justice O'Con-
nor charged that state agencies are not "think tanks to which Congress
may assign problems for extended study."142 She added that "compulsion
of state agencies, unlike pre-emption, blurs the lines of political ac-
countability and leaves citizens feeling that their representatives are
no longer responsive to local needs."143
In a separate attack on PURPA, Justice O'Connor, while recog-
nizing that the Court had not fully clarified the meaning of the term
"traditional state function" as used by the Usery Court, asserted that
132. Id. at 753-58; id. at 775 (Powell, J., dissenting in part; O'Connor, J., dissenting in
part).
133. Id. at 759.
134. Id. at 765.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 761-62.
137. Id. at 762, n. 26 (citing Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 695 (1979)).
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 775 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
140. Id. at 781 n.8.
141. Id. at 765 (majority opinion).
142. Id. at 777 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
143. Id. at 787.
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"[ultility regulation is a traditional function of state government, and
the regulatory commission is the most integral part of that function.
" 144
She argued that the state regulatory function includes the power to de-
cide the structure of agency agendas. 145 Moreover, as a result of com-
pelling the Mississippi commission to spend its limited resources on
the consideration of federal proposals, the commission would be less
able to address local problems and discharge its traditional functions.
46
She suggested, therefore, that PURPA violated the Usery test for com-
pliance with the Tenth Amendment. 147
E. Cases Since Garcia
Three years after FERC was decided, the Garcia court rejected
the Usery traditional function test.148 However, just as Usery failed to
provide adequate guidelines for -determining which functions are tra-
ditional and integral to state governments, neither does Garcia provide
adequate guidelines to determine when the national political process
has failed. Perhaps because of this lack of guidelines, no federal ap-
pellate court decision since Garcia has held a federal statute unconsti-
tutional on the grounds that it resulted from a defect in the political
process, unless New York can be interpreted as having done so.
The chief post-Garcia case involving a challenge to federal leg-
islation based on an alleged defect in the political process was South
Carolina v. Baker.149 South Carolina alleged that the political process
failed when Congress enacted the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil-
ity Act of 1982 (TEFRA).' S0 TEFRA abolished the federal income tax
exemption for interest earned on bonds offered by state and local gov-
ernments, except for bonds issued in registered form.1 51 South Car-
olina argued that the political process failed, because Congress was
not adequately informed when it enacted TEFRA.15 2
Rejecting South Carolina's argument, the Court asserted that
"nothing in Garcia or the Tenth Amendment authorizes courts to sec-
ond-guess the substantive basis for congressional legislation."15 3 How-
ever, the Court did suggest some basis for applying the Garcia test: If
Congress "singles out" a state in a manner that leaves it politically iso-
144. Id. at 781.
145. Id. at 779.
146. Id. at 781.
147. Id. at 782.
148. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
149. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
150. Id. at 513 (citing Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-248 § 310(b)(1), 96 Stat. 324, 596 (1982)).
151. Id. at 507-508 (citing TEFRA §310(b)(1)).
152. Id. at 513.
153. Id.
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lated and powerless, the legislative act in question might manifest a
defect in the political process. 5 4
South Carolina also claimed that the statute commandeered
state legislatures by forcing them to issue only registered bonds and to
expend efforts to determine how to implement a new system of issu-
ing state and local government bonds.155 The Court rejected the argu-
ment, observing that "[sluch 'commandeering' is ... an inevitable
consequence of regulating a state activity."I5m Federal regulations de-
mand compliance in general, and states engaging in regulated activity
often "must take administrative[,] and sometimes legislative[, action
to comply with federal standards." 15 7 Therefore, requiring state action
to comply with a valid federal regulation cannot be deemed to present
a constitutional defect.158 The Court noted that cases prior to Garcia re-
peatedly affirmed congressional power to "impose federal requirements
on States that States could meet only by amending their statutes." 59
Justice O'Connor provided the sole dissenting vote in South Car-
olina v. Baker, basing her dissent on the doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunity, rather than on Tenth Amendment grounds.26° She said
that the Court "fail[ed] to inquire into the substantial adverse effects
on state and local governments that would follow from federal taxa-
tion of the interest on state and local bonds."1 61 While she acknowl-
edged that the taxation of interest earned on unregistered state and
local bonds was less burdensome than a tax on the interest from all
state and local bonds, she feared that the tax was part of the gradual
erosion of state sovereignty. 62 Her dissent included a quote from Pro-
fessor Lawrence Tribe that has echoed throughout modern Tenth Amend-
ment cases: "If there is any danger [of Congress obliterating the states],
it lies in the tyranny of small decisions-in the prospect that Congress
will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essen-
tially nothing is left but a gutted shell."163
ANALYSIS
New York appears to have reached the correct result. The take-
title provision of LLRWPAA would have operated as a sanction against
154. Id.
155. Id. at 514.
156, Id.
157. Id, at 514-15.
158. Id. at 515.
159. Id.
160, Id. at 530-34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 531.
162. Id. at 533.
163. Id. (quoting L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 381 (2d ed. 1988)). See also
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 774-75 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting in part) (same,
but fuller, quote).
Winter 19941
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
states that do not develop a LLRW disposal facility alone or in con-
junction with other states by 1996. The provision would have imposed
on aberrant states not merely a fine, but an unquantifiable liability. In
addition, the sanction would have represented a forced subsidy from
the state to private industry. As such, the sanction was potentially far
more punitive than any previously imposed by the federal government
in the exercise of its commerce powers.
Such liability would have been potentially far more costly to
states than the burdens imposed by federal statutes such as the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, or the Tax Equity and Fis-
cal Responsibility Act. In these times, when many states are in great
financial difficulty and are struggling to provide basic services, the forced
taking of title to radioactive wastes could very well have threatened
states' ability to function in a way that the imposition of minimum-
wage laws could not have come close to doing.
Not only was the take-title provision potentially disastrous to
nonconforming states, but it also did not result from the degree of con-
sensus that would be provided by an interstate agreement pursuant to
the Compact Clause, as suggested by the dissent.' 64 Even if the Na-
tional Governors' Association were an appropriate forum for arriving
at interstate agreements, the take-title provision was not part of the
original compromise that the Association presented to Congress. 165
The fact that the Court has shorn LLRWPAA of its take-title
provision should not prevent the Act from achieving its essential goals.
The policy behind the Act was to distribute responsibility for LLRW
disposal among the states, and to encourage the management of LLRW
disposal on a regional basis.166 To achieve this result, Congress had to
eliminate the constitutional prohibition on states from erecting barri-
ers to the shipment of waste between states.1 67 The take-title provi-
sion was not a necessary part of eliminating that barrier.
With the 1992 deadline having passed, LLRW generators in New
York no longer have the right to export the waste outside New York,
unless the state forms a regional compact with other states. The orig-
inal sited states, Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina, are only
164. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. A compact generally requires not
only congressional ratification, but also legislative ratification by each state involved in
the compact. See, e.g., Columbia Gorge United-Protecting People and Property v. Yeutter,
20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,162 (Litigation) (D. Or. May 23, 1990) (No. 88-1319-
P4).
165. D. Berkovitz, Waste Wars: Did Congress "Nuke" State Sovereignty in the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Amendments Act of 1985?, 11 Harv.Envtl.L.Rev. 437, 457-58 (1987).
166. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021c(a)(1), 2021d(a)(1) (1988).
167. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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obligated to receive LLRW from states within their respective compacts,168
and then only in accord with the agreements upon which their re-
spective compacts are based. 169 Any other state that develops a dis-
posal site as part of a regional compact will also be able to exclude
LLRW generated outside the region. 70 As a result, the burden on the
sited states is diminished, while states not belonging to compacts that
include a sited state have the responsibility for finding new solutions
to the problem of LLRW disposal. In addition, interstate transportation
of LLRW will be regionally confined, and, as a result, there will prob-
ably be fewer accidents on the nation's highways involving the waste.
On the other hand, it is possible that without the take-title pro-
vision, a state, such as New York, will have less incentive to develop a
waste disposal site than before. If LLRW generators have no place to
send the waste, they may store it on site, thus creating a safety prob-
lem. However, New York could condition new construction of nuclear
power plants, or expansion of existing plants, on the development of
waste-disposal facilities, if it can show, independently of safety con-
cerns, that allowing the construction in the absence of available dis-
posal facilities would have serious economic repercussions.171 Such
state action would likely encourage utilities to develop less polluting
and cheaper means of generating energy.
Alternatively, the federal government could build and operate
its own disposal site in New York.172 Although such federal preemp-
tion of state authority would not encourage waste generators to create
less LLRW, the State of New York would not have to administer or pay
for the operation.
A. The Court's Holding and Dictum
While the outcome of New York seems reasonable, the Court's
reasoning lacks clarity, and its holding is both vague and muddied by
confusing dicta. The Court's holding may be framed as follows: A fed-
168. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(O(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(c) (1988).
170. Id. In theory, another state could develop a disposal site and not join a compact,
in which case that state would lack the authority under the Act to exclude the importation
of out-of-state LLRW destined for private disposal facilities. It seems highly unlikely
that a state would want to do that.
171. The Court has noted that "Congress has left sufficient authority in the states to
allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic
[but not for safety] reasons," Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,223 (1983). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(b)(5) (1988) (LLRWPAA does
not "diminish[l, or otherwise affectfl state law."). Professor Berkovitz suggests that states
could possibly even order a cessation of all existing LLRW generation. Berkovitz, supra
note 165, at 486.
172. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981).
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eral action that is not directed at private parties, but "commandeer[s]
state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes," is
unconstitutional.' 73 Just as the traditional-function test in Usery and
the procedural-defect test in Garcia failed to provide clear guidelines
for determining when a violation of the Tenth Amendment exists, the
new "commandeering" test suffers from the same lack of clarity. For
example, the Court does not indicate whether any federal mandate to
a state government for regulatory purposes would constitute a com-
mandeering, no matter how slight the intrusion. However, Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinions in FERC and Baker suggest that, in her
opinion, it would, at least where legislative or administrative action is
involved. 174 An additional problem with the new test is that the term
,commandeering" connotes a federal takeover of state government.
Such use of hyperbole may tend to distort the issues that underlie the
Constitution's allocation of state and federal powers.
It is also unclear where Garcia stands in the wake of New York.
On one hand, the Court chose neither to apply the Garcia holding to
the facts of New York nor to "revisit" Garcia, because New York did not
involve legislation that was directed both at the states and at private
parties.175 This indicates that the Court did not intend to overrule Gar-
cia. On the other hand, in the final paragraph of the Court's opinion,
the Court delivered what might appear to be the central holding of
New York, but is in reality dictum: "The Federal Government may not
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory pro-
gram."176 If it is assumed that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
the statute upheld by the Garcia court, is a federal regulatory program
as comprehended by the New York court, then FLSA and similar statutes
would seem to stand on shaky constitutional ground.
Perhaps the New York court meant to add a reminder to the
above-quoted statement that it referred only to federal mandates that
are applicable solely to the states. However, whether or not the Court
intended the statement as a warning about federal mandates in gen-
eral, there remains the question of what the Court considered to be a
state-administered "federal regulatory program." Presumably, such a
program is one in which the state government enforces a federal reg-
ulation on the private sector. If that is the case, then the application of
FLSA to the situation in Garcia, where the City of San Antonio was re-
quired only to pay the minimum wage to some of its own employees,
would not constitute a federal regulatory program. However, under
this definition, it is far from clear that a state's taking title to privately
173. New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2428 (1992).
174. See supra notes 139-147, 160-163 and accompanying text,
175. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2420.
176. Id. at 2435.
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generated LLRW constitutes the administration of a regulatory program
either. Regulating LLRW would be directing private industry to deal
with the waste in a certain manner, while taking title to the waste would
be tantamount to removing the problem of LLRW disposal from in-
dustry entirely.
Even a state's providing a disposal site, the state's alternative
under the take-title provision to taking title to the LLRW, would not in
itself clearly constitute regulation of the private sector. However, it comes
closer to meeting the above-presumed definition of "regulatory pro-
gram" than does the state's taking title to the waste. 177 Still, because
the Court failed to define "regulatory program", it is unclear whether
or why the Court considers LLRWPAA to mandate a regulatory pro-
gram while it considers FLSA not to mandate such a program. If, in
fact, the Court believed FLSA to be a mandated regulatory program,
then it is unclear why the Court closed its opinion with a broad state-
ment that would seem to call for the invalidation of a FLSA-type statute.
Consequently, the Court's reason for invalidating the take-title provi-
sion, while leaving Garcia unscathed, is less than convincing.
B. The Court's Ignoring Garcia
The Court's reason for not applying Garcia to the facts of New
York is also unpersuasive. First, although it is true that FLSA is a fed-
eral statute that applies to the private sector as well as to the states, the
focus of the Garcia court was not on the distinction between general
and specific applicability of a statute, but rather on the unworkability
of the "traditional governmental function" test.178 In fact, the Garcia
court was "convinced that the fundamental limitation that the consti-
tutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States
as States' is one of process rather than one of result."171 This princi-
ple, on which the Garcia holding was based, whether or not well founded,
177. The action of providing a waste disposal site could be interpreted as controlling
where private business sends its LLRW, and hence be deemed a regulatory program.
However, such provision of a regional or local disposal site makes it easier for waste
generators to dispose of their waste. Analogously, while setting speed limits is an
example of regulating vehicular traffic, it is not clear that building roads constitutes
regulatory activity. The former places a restriction on the operation of motor vehicles,
while the latter expands the options of the motor vehicle operator.
178. Garcia v. San Antonino Metro, Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538 (1985). It also
bears noting that Justice O'Connor, in her dissent in Garcia, considered the general
applicability of a federal statute to be only a minor factor in evaluating its validity. "It
is insufficient, in assessing the validity of congressional regulation of a State pursuant
to the commerce power, to ask only whether the same regulation would be valid if enforced
against a private party .... It remains relevant that a State is being regulated.. . ." Id.
at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 554.
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appears to apply to the facts of New York no less than it does to the
facts of Garcia.
Second, if a federal statute that compels state administration
of a federal regulatory program constitutes a commandeering of state
government, it is hard to see how such a statute that also applies di-
rectly to the citizenry s° represents any less of a commandeering. Al-
though the Court did not explain the significance of the distinction
between generally applicable laws that apply to state and local gov-
ernments and laws that compel state action only, it hinted at that sig-
nificance in its discussion on the accountability of public officials.'81
The Court observed that "where the Federal Government directs the
States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of
public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regu-
latory program ma y remain insulated from the electoral ramifications
of their decision."18 2 The Court further pointed to the choice of a dis-
posal-facility location as the state action that would likely draw pub-
lic disapproval, thus implying that the process of making that choice
is the objectionable regulatory program.'8 3
However, the Court failed to explain how the take-title provi-
sion differs from FLSA and other generally applicable statutes in terms
of their effect on accountability. The Court's assumption that federal
officials will be held accountable when exercising federal preemption
powers because their decision is made "in full view of the public"' 84
does not address this distinction. After all, LLRWPAA, as a congres-
sional decision, was made as much "in the full view of the public" as
any enactment of a federal statute that preempts state decisionmak-
ing.
C. LLRWPAA, FLSA, and Political Accountability
The crucial distinction between the take-title provision 185 and
FLSA is that the latter affects the national electorate much more di-
rectly than would the former. Because FLSA is directed at private en-
180. The Garcia court stressed that the mass transit agency "faces nothing more than
the same minimum-wage and overtime obligations that hundreds of thousands of other
employees, public as well as private, have to meet." Id.
181. New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2424, 2432 (1992).
182. Id. at 2424 (citing D. La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political
Process - The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw.U. L. Rev. 577, 639-
665 (1985); D. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 61-62 (1988)).
183. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2432.
184. Id. at 2424.
185. Here the take-title provision is assumed to include LLRWPAA's mandate to states
to provide disposal facilities, because the take-title provision would become operative
only where a state fails to make provisions for a disposal site by January 1, 1996. 42
U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)(ii) (1988).
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terprise as well as state governments, business executives are direct
targets of the legislation, and they have considerable means to influ-
ence the outcome of the election of their national representatives. Con-
sumers are also affected by FLSA, although less directly, and they, too,
have the potential to cause the defeat of those national legislators who
inflict excessively burdensome labor regulations on the body politic.
Moreover, FLSA has committed the resources of the federal govern-
ment to the enforcement of the minimum-wage laws, thereby affecting
the entire national electorate. To the extent that the electorate, which
includes business people, consumers, and taxpayers, becomes dissat-
isfied, it can and will hold Congress accountable.186
On the other hand, the national electorate is much less likely
to hold Congress accountable for LLRWPAA's take-title provision. Be-
cause citizens were not directly affected by the provision, and because
the states would have had to make difficult choices regarding the sit-
ing of the disposal facilities, the citizens of those states would likely
have held state officials primarily accountable for unpopular choices,
as the New York court so aptly observed.1 87
The Court made reference to the significance of Congress's de-
cision not to commit its own resources to cover the financial and ad-
ministrative costs required by LLRWPAA. 1 s However, by focusing
largely on the distinction between congressional encouragement and
congressional compulsion,' 89 the Court missed the opportunity to stress
186. Professor La Pierre has labeled this phenomenon a "political check" on Congress'
power to intrude on state authority. La Pierre, supra note 182, at 639. He agrees with the
majority in Garcia that the national political process generally safeguards states' sovereignty,
but he believes that Garcia offered neither an adequate explanation of how the states are
protected nor a method for determining when the political process fails. Id. at 581. La
Pierre argues that although the national political process acts as a restraint on Congress'
power to diminish state autonomy in applying policies approved by a national majority,
it only does so in the presence of political checks that make Congress politically accountable
for the exercise of that power. Id. at 639. Those checks are: 1) the tendency of the people
directly affected (and to a lesser extent, those indirectly affected) by the statute in question
to "assign the blame or credit to Congress", id. at 646; and 2) the tendency of the taxpayers,
who are burdened by the congressional expenditure of financial and administrative
resources needed to enforce the statute, to hold Congress accountable. Id. at 647.
These checks are generally present in the case of legislation that is applicable
both to state and private activity, and they "provide vicarious protection for the states'
interests." Id. at 648-649. La Pierre argues that the application of FLSA to public employees
is covered by the political checks, but only for those public employees with counterparts
in the private sector who provide similar goods and services. Id. at 649-650. The first
political check is not present, for example, where FLSA is applied to the police, because
the application "falls exclusively or primarily on the states" and their subdivisions. Id.
at 649 n.381.
187. See supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
188. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2424.
189. Id.
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that it is precisely the failure to commit national resources that allows
Congress to escape political accountability by federal taxpayers. Al-
though the national electorate, in terms of the individuals who com-
prise it, is the sum of the state electorates, it is not politically the sum
of those electorates. Each state would have a unique set of problems
connected with the federal program, and would be faced with a unique
set of choices for which its particular electorate would hold it ac-
countable.
The consequence to a state for not choosing to develop and op-
erate a disposal site would have been the forced ownership of the
LLRW generated within its borders. Such a burden would arguably be
even more onerous than developing and operating a disposal site, be-
cause the state would potentially be subject to enormous liability. That
liability would also be a burden borne solely by the state. In the event
that the liability became actualized, the state would undoubtedly face
difficult budgetary choices due to the drain on its treasury. Once again,
Congress would be insulated from the brunt of citizen anger resulting
from unpopular choices made by the state under the circumstances.
D. How the Court Could Have Applied Garcia
Although there is a significant distinction in terms of political
accountability between generally applicable federal statutes and statutes
that are directed solely at the states, the Court need not have ignored
Garcia in its analysis of the take-title provision. The Court missed the
opportunity to explain that the lack of accountability may be a defect
in the political process that requires a Tenth Amendment safeguard.
Had the Court attempted to apply Garcia to the facts of New York, it
would have had to ask whether the take-title provision resulted from
a defect in the national political process in a way to make it destruc-
tive of state sovereignty.190 Of course, the Court might not have found
such a defect. If the Court limited its inquiry to the test suggested in
Baker, it probably would have upheld the take-title provision, because,
in the process of enacting LLRWPAA, New York was not "singled out
in a way that left it politically isolated and powerless."
191
However, there are at least two ways in which the Court could
have found a defect in the political process. One would be to analyze
LLRWPAA in terms of political accountability using the methodology
suggested above. The Court, in fact, did discuss political accountabil-
ity, but it assumed incorrectly that any federal statute that mandates
state action would enable Congress to avoid being held accountable.
In any event, the Court could have concluded that the shift in politi-
190. See supra text accompanying notes 111-114.
191. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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cal accountability occasioned by the take-title provision stemmed from
the sort of defect to which the Garcia court alluded.
A second means of discovering such a defect would be to ask
whether the statute has the potential to impose such a financial bur-
den on the state as to seriously threaten the state's ability to govern.
The take-title provision, if applied to a state that was unable to find a
suitable LLRW disposal site, would impose unlimited and uncertain li-
ability on the state by shifting all of private industry's LLRW liability
onto the state. Given the danger of LLRW to human and environmen-
tal health, such an imposition of liability could trigger a grave finan-
cial crisis for the state in the event of a serious accident or a series of
accidents, unless the federal government were committed to incurring
a substantial part of that liability. The power of the federal government
to contribute to the weakening of a state government in this manner is
arguably a defect in the national political process.
Thus the Court could have justified its invalidation of the take-
title provision by finding a defect in the national political process and
applying Garcia to determine the existence of a Tenth Amendment vi-
olation. The Court could have done that with only minimal clarifica-
tion of the procedural-defect test. The New York court also could have
invoked the Guarantee Clause.192 If the federal government could sad-
dle a state with liability that could threaten its ability to govern, it could
be deemed not to guarantee that state's right to a republican form of
government. 93
CONCLUSION
The take-title provision of LLRWPAA was correctly invalidated
by the Court. The provision was intended to force states to choose be-
tween providing disposal facilities for commercially generated LLRW
and incurring total liability for the waste. It could have had a disas-
trous effect on a state that was either unable or unwilling to carry out
the federal mandate. Furthermore, the take-title provision was not nec-
essary to achieve the essential purpose of LLRWPAA.
However, the Court's reasoning in reaching its decision was
not clearly structured, and its holding is rather vague. The Court's lack
192. See supra note 15.
193. See Merritt, supra note 182. Professor Merritt suggests employing the Guarantee
Clause in general, rather than the Tenth Amendment, to establish a "limit on federal
power to meddle with state sovereignty." Id. at 1-2. She interprets the Guarantee Clause
as prohibiting the federal government from destroying state governments. Id. at 40-41.
Her thesis also involves political accountability, id. at 61, and reaches conclusions that
are similar to those of Professor La Pierre.
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of clear guidelines may result in unnecessarily broad interpretations
of what constitutes a commandeering of state government. Such in-
terpretations may even be encouraged by the Court's dictum calling
for the prohibition on the congressional imposition of federal regula-
tory programs on the states. This is especially troublesome, as the Court
did not make clear what it means by a regulatory program.
Although the Court distinguished Garcia on the grounds that
FLSA is a statute aimed at both the states and private activities while
the take-title provision was aimed only at the states, it did not explain
the significance of that distinction in terms of federalism principles.
The Court correctly observed that Congress insulated itself from po-
litical accountability in saddling the states with the burdens imposed
by LLRWPAA, but it failed to explain how Congress would be held
politically accountable for enacting the amendments to FLSA. In essence,
the Court ignored Garcia, and missed the opportunity to show how the
take-title provision resulted from a defect in the national political
process.
The Court could have asserted that the take-title sanction posed
a serious threat to the ability of state governments to govern, because
of its considerable potential financial effect. Congressional power to
impose such a liability on states is an example of a defect in the na-
tional process, because it allows for a significant weakening of state
sovereignty by the federal government. Also, because a state's ability
to maintain a republican form of government is dependent on its abil-
ity to govern, such congressional power arguably violates the Guar-
antee Clause. Striking down the take-title provision as a violation of
the Guarantee Clause would represent the narrowest holding consis-
tent with the Court's decision, as long as the Court made it clear that
its decision was based on the enormity of the financial burden imposed
on the states.
To construct a broader holding, the Court could have relied on
a more clearly developed theory of political accountability, whereby a
presumed power of Congress to substantially shift political account-
ability from itself to state and local governments represents a defect in
the national political process. Not every statute that appears to "com-
mandeer" state and local government substantially shifts accountabil-
ity in this manner. FLSA is an example of such a statute that does not
insulate Congress from accountability, because the state is only one of
a number of affected enterprises, and because Congress has commit-
ted national resources to enforcing the statute. The take-title provision,
on the other hand, possessed neither of these qualities. The provision
was directed only at the states, and Congress committed essentially no
national resources either to the development of LLRW-disposal facili-
ties or to the acquisition of liability for the waste.
[Vol, 34
DISPOSAL OF RADIO-ACTIVE WASTE
Either of the above alternatives to the commandeering test
would provide a reasonable basis for deciding when to invalidate a
federal statute on federalism grounds. Either alternative would have
left many recent federal statutes on stable, rather than shaky, ground. 194
More importantly, they would have brought New York into harmony
with Garcia, and would have clarified Garcia's procedural-defect test,
thereby rendering the test a workable tool for deciding when a feder-
alism question should be reviewed by the courts.
Richard D. Weiner
194. Not all statutes discussed in this note would clearly survive the application of
the political accountability test. PURPA is a notable exception. Although PURPA is
intended to affect private industry, its provisions are directed solely at the states. Further,
Congress did not commit any federal resources to enforcing PURPA, and therefore stands
to avoid accountability. The main distinction between PURPA and LLRWPAA in terms
of political accountability lies in the magnitude of their intrusion on the states. See La
Pierre, supra note 182, at 660-662. Whether PURPA would survive the accountability test
would depend on whether or not the magnitude of the intrusion were a factor in the
application of the test.
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